AQA A-Level Psychology: Paper 1 - Introductory Topics

7182/1     2 hours     96 marks     33.3% of A-Level     Topics: Social Influence, Memory, Attachment, Clinical Psychology and Mental Health

Topic 1 - Social Influence

1.1  Types of conformity & explanations

Conformity (majority influence): a change in a person's behaviour or opinions as a result of real or imagined group pressure. The 2025 AQA spec requires two types:

Internalisation
The deepest form. The individual genuinely accepts the group's beliefs as their own, both publicly and privately. The change is permanent and persists in the absence of the group.
Compliance
The shallowest form. The individual publicly agrees with the group but privately disagrees. The change is temporary and stops when group pressure is removed.

Explanations for conformity (Deutsch & Gerard 1955 - the two-process theory):

Normative Social Influence (NSI)
Conforming to be liked and accepted by the group; driven by an emotional desire to fit in and avoid rejection. Leads to compliance. Most likely in situations involving strangers, when the individual feels their behaviour is being judged, or with friends where social approval matters.
Informational Social Influence (ISI)
Conforming to be right; driven by a cognitive desire for accurate information. Leads to internalisation. Most likely in ambiguous situations, in a crisis, or when others are perceived as experts.

NSI vs ISI is one of the most testable distinctions. NSI = emotional, wanting to fit in, compliance. ISI = cognitive, wanting to be right, internalisation. Always link to a contextual cue: ambiguity points to ISI; group acceptance points to NSI.


Evaluation of NSI/ISI:

  • Research support for NSI: Asch (1951) - many participants conformed despite knowing the answer was wrong, citing fear of disapproval. When participants wrote answers privately, conformity fell to 12.5%.
  • Research support for ISI: Lucas et al. (2006) - participants conformed more to incorrect maths answers when problems were difficult, especially those who rated their maths ability as poor.
  • Individual differences (nAffiliators): McGhee & Teevan (1967) - students with a strong need for affiliation conformed more, suggesting NSI does not affect everyone equally.
  • Difficulty separating NSI and ISI: in real situations both processes often operate together, so the dual-process model may oversimplify.

1.2  Asch (1951) - conformity research

Asch's baseline study (1951): 123 male American undergraduates judged which of three comparison lines matched a standard line. Each naïve participant was tested with 6-8 confederates who gave unanimous wrong answers on 12 of 18 critical trials.

Findings
36.8% conformity rate on critical trials; 75% conformed at least once; only 25% never conformed. Control condition (no confederates) had under 1% errors.
Why participants conformed
In post-experiment interviews, most cited NSI - they knew the answer was wrong but went along to avoid disapproval. A few showed signs of ISI, doubting their own perception.

Asch's variations - factors affecting conformity:

Group size
Conformity rose sharply from 1 to 3 confederates, then plateaued. With 1 confederate = ~3%; with 3 = ~32%. Adding more had little extra effect.
Unanimity
A single dissenter who gave the correct answer reduced conformity to about 5.5%. Even a dissenter who gave a different wrong answer reduced conformity. Unanimity is therefore critical.
Task difficulty
When the comparison lines were more similar (harder task), conformity increased - suggesting ISI plays a role in ambiguous situations.

Evaluation of Asch:

  • Artificial task and situation: low ecological validity - judging line lengths in a lab does not reflect everyday conformity. Demand characteristics likely (Fiske, 2014: "not very groupy").
  • Limited application - androcentric & ethnocentric sample: all white American males in the 1950s; Neto (1995) suggested women may be more conformist as they value social relationships; conformity may also differ in collectivist cultures (Smith & Bond, 1993 - found higher conformity in collectivist than individualist cultures).
  • Era effects: Perrin & Spencer (1980) replicated Asch in 1980s Britain with engineering students and found only 1 conforming response in 396 trials - 1950s America was a particularly conformist era (McCarthyism).
  • Ethical issues: participants deceived about the true aim; some experienced stress; no fully informed consent.

For AO1 always quote the 36.8% conformity figure and the 75%/25% split. For AO3, the strongest evaluation points are the Perrin & Spencer replication and the ethnocentric/androcentric sample.

1.3  Obedience - Milgram (1963)

Obedience: a form of social influence in which an individual follows a direct order from a figure of authority.

Milgram's baseline study (1963): investigated whether ordinary people would obey unjust orders. Motivated by the Holocaust and the Nuremberg defence ("I was only following orders").

Procedure: 40 American male volunteers (aged 20-50), recruited via newspaper advert, paid $4.50. Each was assigned (via rigged draw) the role of "teacher"; a confederate ("Mr Wallace") played the "learner". The teacher administered increasing electric shocks (15-450 V) for wrong answers, prompted by an experimenter in a grey lab coat using four standardised prods: "Please continue", "The experiment requires that you continue", etc.

Findings
100% reached 300 V; 65% delivered the maximum 450 V. Many showed signs of extreme stress (sweating, trembling, three had seizures). Beforehand, Milgram had asked psychology students and psychiatrists to predict outcomes - they estimated <3% would reach 450 V.
Conclusion
Ordinary people will obey orders to harm an innocent person when commanded by a perceived legitimate authority figure. Obedience is determined more by situational factors than by personality.

Milgram's situational variables (variations):

Proximity
When teacher and learner in the same room: obedience fell from 65% to 40%. Touch-proximity (teacher forced learner's hand onto shock plate): 30%. Remote-instruction (experimenter on phone): 20.5%, and some teachers gave weaker shocks. Reducing proximity to victim and increasing distance from authority both reduce obedience.
Location
When moved from prestigious Yale University to a run-down office in Bridgeport: obedience fell to 47.5%. The setting affects perceived legitimacy of the authority figure.
Uniform
When the experimenter was replaced mid-experiment by an "ordinary member of the public" in everyday clothes: obedience fell to 20%. Uniform acts as a powerful symbol of legitimate authority.

Evaluation of Milgram:

  • Research support: Hofling et al. (1966) - 21 out of 22 real nurses obeyed a doctor's phone instruction to administer an obvious overdose, showing obedience occurs in real settings. Burger (2009) replicated Milgram up to 150 V using extensive safeguards and found similar obedience levels (~70%).
  • Low internal validity: Orne & Holland (1968) argued participants did not believe the shocks were real (demand characteristics). However, Sheridan & King (1972) found 54% of men and 100% of women gave real shocks to a puppy.
  • Ethical issues: deception about the true aim and the learner's identity; no fully informed consent; psychological harm (stress, seizures); inadequate right to withdraw (verbal prods). Baumrind (1964) heavily criticised the study.
  • Alternative explanation - social identity theory: Haslam & Reicher (2012) argue participants obeyed because they identified with the scientific aims of the experiment, not because of agentic blind obedience.
  • Replications across cultures: Mantell (1971) - 85% in Germany; Smith & Bond (1998) note most replications were in Western, culturally similar countries.

The key figures to quote: 65% delivered 450 V; 100% reached 300 V. For situational variables: proximity 40%, location 47.5%, uniform 20%. These specific numbers are credit-worthy in AO1 questions.

1.4  Explanations for obedience - agentic state & legitimacy of authority

Social-psychological explanations developed by Milgram to explain his findings:

Agentic state
A mental state where the individual feels no personal responsibility for their actions because they see themselves as an "agent" carrying out the wishes of an authority figure. Opposite is the autonomous state (acting on one's own principles). The shift from autonomous to agentic is called the agentic shift. Maintained by binding factors (e.g. social etiquette, reluctance to disrupt the experiment) that reduce moral strain.
Legitimacy of authority
Most societies are structured hierarchically: we are taught from childhood to obey those with legitimate authority (parents, teachers, police, doctors). Authority must be perceived as legitimate (operating in an accepted hierarchy) for obedience to occur. Some authorities have destructive authority - using their position to order harmful acts (e.g. Hitler, Stalin).

Evaluation:

  • Support for agentic state: Milgram (1974) - many participants asked who was responsible if the learner was harmed; the experimenter answered "I am". They then continued. Blass & Schmitt (2001) - viewers of Milgram's film attributed responsibility to the experimenter, not the teacher.
  • Limitation - doesn't explain all findings: Hofling et al. (1966) nurses showed no signs of moral strain, contradicting agentic state predictions.
  • Support for legitimacy of authority: Bickman (1974) - confederates dressed as security guards were obeyed (~92%) more than those in jacket and tie (~49%) when asking strangers to pick up litter; cross-cultural data also support the explanation (variation between cultures in obedience reflects different legitimacy structures).
  • Real-world application: the My Lai massacre (1968) - US soldiers killed ~500 unarmed Vietnamese civilians; Lt William Calley defended himself by claiming he was obeying orders. Useful in explaining real atrocities.

1.5  Dispositional explanation - authoritarian personality (Adorno)

Adorno et al. (1950) proposed a dispositional (personality-based) explanation: some people have an authoritarian personality that makes them more likely to obey.

Characteristics: rigid beliefs in conventional values; submission to authority; hostility toward those of lower status or "out-groups"; intolerance of ambiguity; black-and-white thinking; servile attitudes to those of perceived higher status.

Origin: harsh parenting in childhood - strict discipline, conditional love, high expectations. The child cannot express hostility toward parents, so it is displaced onto weaker out-groups (a Freudian concept) - explaining the prejudice associated with authoritarianism.

Measurement: Adorno developed the F-scale (Fascism scale) - a questionnaire measuring nine personality traits. High scorers identified more strongly with strong figures and were more contemptuous of the weak.


Evaluation:

  • Research support: Elms & Milgram (1966) - interviewed 20 obedient and 20 disobedient participants from Milgram's study; obedient ones scored higher on the F-scale.
  • Correlation not causation: the link is correlational; authoritarianism and obedience could both be caused by a third variable (e.g. lower educational attainment - Middendorp & Meloen, 1990).
  • Methodological issues with the F-scale: all questions are worded in the same direction so high scores may reflect response bias (acquiescence) rather than genuine authoritarianism. Interviews were also subject to interviewer bias.
  • Cannot explain mass obedience: the entire population of Nazi Germany cannot all have had authoritarian personalities. Social identity theory provides a better explanation for widespread obedience.
  • Political bias: the F-scale specifically measures right-wing authoritarianism; it ignores extreme left-wing authoritarianism (e.g. under Stalin) - so it is politically biased (Christie & Jahoda, 1954).

Always name Adorno (1950) and the F-scale. A common 16-mark essay asks you to compare situational and dispositional explanations - balance Milgram's variables against Adorno's personality theory.

1.6  Resistance to social influence

Two main explanations for resisting social influence:

Social support
The presence of allies (one or more others who resist) makes it easier for an individual to resist. In Asch's variation, a single dissenter reduced conformity from 36.8% to about 5.5%. In Milgram's variation, when two disobedient confederates joined the teacher, full obedience dropped to 10%. The ally need not be correct or admirable - merely the act of dissent breaks the unanimity of the group/authority.
Locus of control (Rotter, 1966)
A personality dimension regarding how much control people believe they have over their own behaviour and outcomes. Internal LOC: believe they control their own destiny - more confident, achievement-oriented, less reliant on others' approval; more resistant to social influence. External LOC: believe outcomes are due to luck, fate, or powerful others; more passive; more susceptible to influence.

Evaluation:

  • Support for social support: Allen & Levine (1971) - even an ally with poor eyesight (apparently a weak ally) reduced conformity in an Asch-type task, supporting the role of dissent in breaking unanimity.
  • Support for LOC: Holland (1967) repeated Milgram's procedure and measured LOC: 37% of internals did not continue to the maximum shock vs only 23% of externals.
  • LOC research is mixed: Twenge et al. (2004) found that over a 40-year period young Americans became more resistant to obedience but also more external in LOC - the opposite of what the theory predicts. May reflect a more controlled, less optimistic society.
  • LOC only matters in novel situations: Rotter (1982) noted LOC predicts behaviour only when the situation is new; for familiar situations, prior experience is the main predictor.

1.7  Minority influence - Moscovici (1969)

Minority influence: a form of social influence in which a minority (sometimes just one person) persuades others to adopt their beliefs, attitudes or behaviours. Leads to internalisation - private and public acceptance, often producing genuine attitude change.

Three behaviours that make a minority influential (Moscovici):

Consistency
The minority must keep the same view over time (diachronic consistency) and between members (synchronic consistency). Consistency draws attention and signals commitment to the position.
Commitment
The minority demonstrates dedication to its position through personal sacrifice or risk (augmentation principle) - their willingness to suffer for the cause leads majority members to take them more seriously.
Flexibility
The minority must avoid appearing dogmatic. They should be prepared to compromise on minor points and adapt their position, otherwise they are seen as rigid and unreasonable (Nemeth, 1986).

Moscovici et al. (1969) - blue-green study: 172 female participants in groups of 6 (4 naïve + 2 confederates). Asked to judge the colour of 36 blue slides. In the consistent condition the confederates said "green" on all 36 trials - naïve participants agreed on 8.42% of trials, with 32% agreeing at least once. In the inconsistent condition (green on 24 of 36) agreement fell to 1.25%. A control group (no confederates) showed errors on 0.25% of trials. Demonstrated that consistency is key to minority influence.


Evaluation:

  • Research support for consistency: Wood et al. (1994) meta-analysis of nearly 100 studies confirmed consistent minorities are most influential.
  • Research support for internalisation: Moscovici - when participants wrote answers privately, agreement with the minority view increased - suggesting genuine attitude change had occurred.
  • Artificial task: judging colours of slides lacks ecological validity; real-world minority influence (e.g. civil rights movements) involves complex emotional and political issues.
  • Generalisation issues: all-female sample limits external validity (gender bias).

Topic 2 - Memory

2.1  Multi-Store Model (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968)

The Multi-Store Model (MSM) by Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) describes memory as a linear flow through three structurally distinct stores: sensory register → short-term memory (STM) → long-term memory (LTM).

StoreCodingCapacityDuration
Sensory registerModality-specific (iconic - visual; echoic - auditory)Very large~250 ms (iconic - Sperling, 1960); 2-4 s (echoic)
STMMainly acoustic (Baddeley, 1966)7 ± 2 items (Miller, 1956); ~4 chunks (Cowan, 2001)~18-30 seconds without rehearsal (Peterson & Peterson, 1959)
LTMMainly semantic (Baddeley, 1966)Potentially unlimitedPotentially lifetime (Bahrick et al., 1975)

Information flow: environmental stimuli enter the sensory register; if attended to, transferred to STM. STM holds information via maintenance rehearsal; with prolonged rehearsal (elaborative rehearsal), information is transferred to LTM. Retrieval involves moving information from LTM back into STM.


Evaluation:

  • Supporting evidence (separate stores): Glanzer & Cunitz (1966) - the serial position effect shows free-recall lists are remembered better at the start (primacy - rehearsed into LTM) and end (recency - still in STM); middle items are forgotten. This supports separate STM and LTM stores.
  • Supporting evidence (different coding): Baddeley (1966) - acoustically similar words harder to remember in STM (acoustic coding); semantically similar words harder in LTM (semantic coding).
  • Case study support: patient HM and patient Clive Wearing - both had severely damaged LTM but intact STM, suggesting the stores are separate.
  • Too simplistic - STM is not unitary: Shallice & Warrington (1970) studied patient KF, who had impaired auditory STM but intact visual STM - suggesting STM has subcomponents (supports WMM, not MSM).
  • Rehearsal is not the only way to transfer to LTM: Craik & Lockhart (1972) showed that depth of processing (semantic > phonemic > structural) matters more than rehearsal.

2.2  Working Memory Model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974)

Baddeley & Hitch (1974) proposed the Working Memory Model (WMM) as a more detailed alternative to the unitary STM of the MSM. WMM views STM as an active processing system with multiple components.

Central executive
The "boss" of working memory. Allocates attention to the slave systems and coordinates their activity. Modality-free (processes any sensory input). Very limited capacity. Does not store information.
Phonological loop
Deals with auditory information and preserves the order in which it is heard. Has two sub-components: the phonological store (the "inner ear" - holds words you hear) and the articulatory process (the "inner voice" - allows maintenance rehearsal, capacity ~2 seconds).
Visuo-spatial sketchpad
Deals with visual and spatial information. The "inner eye". Capacity ~3-4 objects (Baddeley). Logie (1995) subdivided it into the visual cache (stores visual data: colour, form) and the inner scribe (records arrangement of objects, transfers information to central executive).
Episodic buffer
Added by Baddeley in 2000. A temporary store that integrates information from the other components and links working memory to LTM. Capacity ~4 chunks. The "general-purpose" buffer of working memory.

Dual-task evidence: participants can perform two tasks simultaneously if they use different components (e.g. one visual + one verbal task), but performance drops sharply when both tasks use the same component (e.g. two visual tasks).


Evaluation:

  • Case study support: Shallice & Warrington (1970) - patient KF had brain damage; his verbal STM (phonological loop) was impaired but visual STM (sketchpad) intact - supports the separate components.
  • Dual-task experiments: Baddeley et al. (1975) - participants found it harder to do two visual tasks at once than one visual + one verbal - supports the existence of separate slave systems.
  • Word-length effect: Baddeley et al. (1975) - participants remembered fewer long words (multi-syllable) than short ones in immediate recall - reflects the 2-second articulatory loop capacity.
  • Central executive is vague: the central executive has not been well-defined or measured; Baddeley himself (2003) said it is the most important but least understood component.
  • Lack of clarity on episodic buffer: the buffer was added late (2000) to explain things WMM could not - somewhat ad hoc.
  • Lab studies vs everyday memory: dual-task evidence largely comes from artificial tasks; real-world generalisation is debated.

Always cite Baddeley & Hitch (1974) by name. Examiners look for the four components named in order. For evaluation, KF and the dual-task evidence are the strongest points.

2.3  Explanations of forgetting - interference

Interference theory: forgetting occurs because one memory blocks the recall of another, causing distortion or forgetting. More likely when memories are similar.

Proactive interference (PI)
Older memories interfere with the recall of newer ones. Example: a teacher learning new students' names struggles because old students' names interfere.
Retroactive interference (RI)
Newer memories interfere with the recall of older ones. Example: after learning Spanish, an English speaker who previously knew French may forget French vocabulary.

Key study - McGeoch & McDonald (1931): participants learned a list of 10 words to perfect recall, then learned a second list. Recall of the first list was tested. The more similar the second list to the first (synonyms most similar; numbers most different), the worse the recall of the first list - showing interference is greatest when memories are similar.


Evaluation:

  • Strong evidence from lab studies: thousands of lab studies support interference as a cause of forgetting in STM and LTM.
  • Real-world support: Baddeley & Hitch (1977) - rugby players who had played the most games during a season remembered fewer team names than those who played fewer (similar memories interfering).
  • Artificial materials: word lists are very different from real-life memories; lab tasks may exaggerate interference effects.
  • Time intervals: typical lab studies present material in close succession, which is rare in real life - interference may be less important outside the lab.
  • Interference is temporary - retrieval may work: Tulving & Psotka (1971) - cued recall reversed apparent interference effects, suggesting memories are accessible but not retrievable - challenges interference as a complete explanation.

2.4  Explanations of forgetting - retrieval failure

Retrieval failure due to absence of cues: forgetting occurs not because the memory has gone, but because the right retrieval cues are unavailable. Tulving's Encoding Specificity Principle (1983): a cue must be present at encoding and at retrieval, and the closer the cue to the encoded form, the better the recall.

Context-dependent forgetting
Cues are external (environmental). Recall is worse if the external context at retrieval differs from that at encoding. Godden & Baddeley (1975): divers learned word lists on land or underwater, recalled in same or different context. Recall was ~40% lower when contexts differed.
State-dependent forgetting
Cues are internal (mood, physical state). Recall is worse if the internal state at retrieval differs from that at encoding. Carter & Cassaday (1998): participants given antihistamine recalled less when state at retrieval (drug/no drug) differed from state at encoding.

Evaluation:

  • Strong supporting evidence: both Godden & Baddeley and Carter & Cassaday provide controlled experimental support. Eysenck (2010) called retrieval failure the main reason for forgetting in LTM.
  • Real-world application: the cognitive interview (Fisher & Geiselman) uses context reinstatement to improve EWT recall - a practical application.
  • Recall vs recognition: Godden & Baddeley (1980) repeated the study using recognition rather than recall - the context effect disappeared. Suggests retrieval failure applies only to recall, limiting the theory.
  • Context effects can be artificial: Baddeley (1997) noted that everyday contexts rarely differ as dramatically as land vs underwater, so context effects may be exaggerated in lab studies.
  • Encoding specificity is circular: the only way to know whether a cue was encoded is to test recall - making the theory hard to falsify (Nairne, 2002).

The exam often asks you to compare interference and retrieval failure. Remember: interference says the memory is damaged or blocked; retrieval failure says the memory is intact but inaccessible without the right cue.

2.5  EWT - misleading information (Loftus & Palmer, 1974)

Eyewitness testimony (EWT): the ability of people to remember the details of events they have observed, such as accidents and crimes. EWT is influenced by misleading information.

Loftus & Palmer (1974) - speed estimates and the leading question study:

Experiment 1: 45 American students watched 7 short film clips of car accidents and were asked: "About how fast were the cars going when they ___ each other?" The verb varied:

Verb usedMean speed estimate (mph)
Contacted31.8
Hit34.0
Bumped38.1
Collided39.3
Smashed40.5

Experiment 2: a week later, participants who had heard "smashed" were significantly more likely to report (falsely) seeing broken glass than those who heard "hit". Concluded that misleading information can alter the actual memory (substitution explanation), not just bias the response.


Two ways misleading information affects EWT:

Leading questions
Questions phrased in a way that suggests a particular answer (e.g. "How fast were the cars going when they smashed?"). Affect the memory itself (substitution) or the response (response bias).
Post-event discussion
When witnesses discuss the event together, their accounts can contaminate each other. Gabbert et al. (2003): pairs of participants watched the same crime from different angles, then discussed; 71% of witnesses reported information they had not actually seen - "memory conformity".

Evaluation:

  • Real-world application: Loftus's work has changed how police forces and the legal system treat eyewitness testimony, including the design of police interviews.
  • Artificial tasks: watching film clips lacks the emotional impact of real crime; Loftus & Palmer's participants may have lacked the engagement of a true witness.
  • Individual differences - age: Anastasi & Rhodes (2006) found people are more accurate when identifying people of their own age (own age bias). Children and the elderly are more susceptible to misleading information than young adults.
  • Demand characteristics: Zaragoza & McCloskey (1989) argued participants in Loftus's studies may have given the answer they thought the experimenter wanted, especially in forced-choice questions.
  • Contradictory real-world evidence: Yuille & Cutshall (1986) - real witnesses to a violent armed robbery in Vancouver gave accurate accounts 4 months later and were not affected by misleading questions, suggesting lab studies overestimate the effect.

2.6  EWT - anxiety

Anxiety has both positive and negative effects on EWT - findings appear contradictory.

Negative effect - weapon focus
Johnson & Scott (1976): participants in a waiting room overheard either a low-anxiety scenario (a man with a pen and grease on hands) or a high-anxiety scenario (a man with a paper-knife covered in blood). Identification of the man from photographs was 49% in the low-anxiety vs 33% in the high-anxiety condition. Suggests anxiety/the weapon narrowed attention, reducing recall of the perpetrator.
Positive effect - flashbulb-like memory
Yuille & Cutshall (1986): 13 witnesses to a real gun shop shooting in Vancouver were interviewed 4-5 months later. The most anxious witnesses gave the most accurate accounts (88% accuracy vs 75%). Suggests in real high-anxiety events, witnesses recall more, not less.

The Yerkes-Dodson Law (1908) - inverted-U explanation:

Anxiety affects performance in an inverted U-shape: low anxiety = low recall; moderate anxiety = optimum recall; very high anxiety = decline in recall. Deffenbacher (1983) applied this to EWT, suggesting moderate stress aids recall but extreme stress impairs it.


Evaluation:

  • Support for negative effect: Loftus et al. (1987) used eye-tracking to confirm participants spent more time looking at a weapon than at the person holding it - supporting weapon focus.
  • Field studies have higher ecological validity: Yuille & Cutshall studied real eyewitnesses; results contradict lab findings.
  • Pickel (1998): argued weapon focus is due to unusualness, not anxiety - participants showed worse identification when a man held a raw chicken (unusual but not threatening) than scissors (usual in context). Questions whether anxiety itself is the cause.
  • Yerkes-Dodson is over-simplistic: assumes only one dimension of anxiety; in reality, EWT involves cognitive, emotional, and physiological factors.
  • Ethical issues: deliberately creating anxiety in participants raises concerns; field studies of real witnesses avoid this but suffer from less control.

2.7  Cognitive interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992)

The cognitive interview (CI) developed by Fisher & Geiselman (1992) is a research-based technique designed to improve EWT accuracy. It is based on cognitive principles of memory.

Four main techniques:

1. Report everything
Witnesses are encouraged to report every detail of the event, even those that seem trivial. Apparently irrelevant details may trigger more important memories or be useful when combined with other accounts.
2. Reinstate the context
Witnesses mentally return to the scene of the crime, including the environment (sights, sounds, weather) and their emotional state at the time. Based on the encoding specificity principle.
3. Reverse the order
Events are recalled in different chronological orders (e.g. end to beginning). Prevents reliance on schemas/expectations of "what usually happens" and may reveal new details.
4. Change perspective
Witnesses recall the event from different perspectives (e.g. from another witness's viewpoint). Disrupts schema-based recall and encourages more thorough retrieval.

Enhanced cognitive interview (ECI): Fisher et al. (1987) added social components - building rapport with the witness, minimising distractions, letting the witness speak slowly, asking open questions.


Evaluation:

  • Strong meta-analytic evidence: Köhnken et al. (1999) meta-analysis of 53 studies found CI gave 34% more correct information than the standard police interview.
  • Increase in incorrect information: the same meta-analysis found CI also increased incorrect details; Köhnken et al. (1999) noted accuracy rates were 84% for CI vs 82% for standard - similar in proportional accuracy, but more material overall.
  • Some elements are more effective: Milne & Bull (2002) - combining "report everything" and "reinstate context" produced the best recall; "reverse the order" and "change perspective" added little. May not need all four.
  • Time and training-intensive: CI takes much longer than a standard interview; many police forces only use parts. Lack of training and lack of time make full implementation difficult.
  • Children: Geiselman (1999) noted children under 6 may find "change perspective" too difficult cognitively, suggesting CI is less suitable for very young witnesses.

For AO1 always name Fisher & Geiselman (1992) and the four techniques: report everything, reinstate context, reverse the order, change perspective. For AO3, the Köhnken meta-analysis is the strongest positive evidence.

Topic 3 - Attachment

3.1  Animal studies - Lorenz (1935) & Harlow (1958)

Lorenz (1935) - geese and imprinting:

Procedure: divided a clutch of greylag goose eggs into two groups. Half hatched naturally with the mother; the other half hatched in an incubator with Lorenz as the first moving object they saw.

Findings: the incubator group followed Lorenz everywhere, even after being mixed with the mother-reared group. Lorenz called this imprinting: animals attach to and follow the first moving object they see during a critical period (~13-16 hours after hatching). Imprinting is irreversible and affects sexual imprinting in adulthood (a male peacock raised with tortoises later only mated with tortoises).


Harlow (1958) - rhesus monkeys and contact comfort:

Procedure: 16 infant rhesus monkeys raised with two "surrogate mothers": a wire mother (uncomfortable, dispensed milk) and a cloth-covered mother (comfortable, no milk). Time spent with each was measured.

Findings: monkeys spent most of their time with the cloth mother (~17-18 hours a day vs ~1 hour with the wire mother), going to the wire mother only briefly to feed. When frightened (by a mechanical "monster"), they ran to the cloth mother for comfort. Harlow concluded that attachment is based on contact comfort, not feeding (contradicting cupboard-love theory).

Long-term effects: the cloth-reared but isolated monkeys grew up with severe consequences: socially abnormal, unable to form normal relationships, abusive or neglectful as mothers themselves. Harlow proposed a critical period of 90 days - after which deprived monkeys could not recover normal social functioning.


Evaluation:

  • Lorenz - imprinting is more flexible than thought: Guiton et al. (1966) - chicks imprinted on yellow rubber gloves later tried to mate with them but could be reversed through training - challenges Lorenz's claim of irreversibility.
  • Generalisation to humans is limited: birds attach differently from mammals. Humans show emotional responses to attachment figures and are not "imprinted" in the same way.
  • Harlow's theoretical impact: profoundly influential - shifted theory from feeding/cupboard-love (learning theory) to comfort/relationship-based attachment.
  • Harlow's real-world value: Howe (1998) - findings helped social workers and clinical psychologists understand neglect; informed care of caged primates.
  • Severe ethical issues with Harlow: monkeys suffered lifelong psychological harm. Harlow himself called the wire mothers "iron maidens". Question of whether the ends justified the means; some argue findings could not have been obtained otherwise.
  • Generalisation to humans: rhesus monkeys are more similar to humans than geese, but they are still not human; cultural and cognitive factors complicate the picture.

For Lorenz always cite 1935 and use the terms imprinting, critical period, and sexual imprinting. For Harlow, cite 1958, contact comfort, and the 90-day critical period.

3.2  Explanations of attachment - learning theory

Learning theory of attachment - "cupboard love": proposed by behaviourists (e.g. Dollard & Miller, 1950). Babies become attached to their caregiver because the caregiver provides food.

Classical conditioning
UCS: food → UCR: pleasure. NS: caregiver, initially produces no response. Caregiver is repeatedly paired with food. Over time the NS becomes the CS: the caregiver alone produces the CR of pleasure → infant becomes attached.
Operant conditioning
Sears et al. (1957): babies feel discomfort when hungry; feeding removes the discomfort (negative reinforcement). Crying produces a caregiver response (food, comfort) - positive reinforcement for the baby. The caregiver is also reinforced by the cessation of crying - mutual reinforcement strengthens the bond.

Drive reduction: hunger is a primary drive (biological); the caregiver becomes associated with food and so becomes a secondary reinforcer. Attachment is acquired because the caregiver becomes the source of reward.


Evaluation:

  • Contradicting evidence - Harlow (1958): rhesus monkeys preferred a cloth mother that gave no food over a wire mother that did - directly contradicts learning theory.
  • Contradicting evidence - Schaffer & Emerson (1964): many babies' primary attachment was not to the person who fed them but to the most responsive caregiver.
  • Some elements may apply: conditioning may still play a role in associating caregivers with comfort and care - learning theory is not entirely wrong, but is insufficient as a complete explanation.
  • Reductionist: reduces a complex emotional bond to simple stimulus-response learning; ignores cognitive and emotional aspects.

3.3  Bowlby's monotropic theory (1969)

Bowlby (1969) proposed an evolutionary theory of attachment, rejecting learning theory. Key features can be remembered as ASCMI:

Adaptive
Attachment is an innate system that gives an evolutionary advantage. Babies who stay close to caregivers are more likely to survive (food, protection, warmth).
Social releasers
Babies are born with innate "cute" behaviours (smiling, cooing, gripping, big eyes) that elicit caregiving from adults. Reciprocal - they activate the adult attachment system.
Critical period
Attachment must be formed within a critical period of approximately 0-2.5 years (Bowlby later called it a sensitive period). After this window, attachment is much harder to form and the child risks lasting harm.
Monotropy
Babies form one special attachment (usually the mother) - the primary attachment figure. Two laws: (1) the law of continuity - the more constant and predictable the care, the stronger the attachment; (2) the law of accumulated separation - the effects of separations add up.
Internal working model
The infant forms a mental representation of their first relationship with the primary attachment figure. This becomes a template for future relationships. A securely attached child expects positive relationships; a poorly attached child expects them to be untrustworthy.

The continuity hypothesis: there is consistency between early attachment and emotional behaviour later in life. The internal working model also influences parenting style in adulthood, explaining the intergenerational transmission of attachment patterns.


Evaluation:

  • Research support for monotropy & sensitive period: Bailey et al. (2007) - mothers with poor attachments to their own mothers had children classified as poorly attached. Supports the internal working model and intergenerational transmission.
  • Research support for social releasers: Brazelton et al. (1975) - when caregivers were instructed to ignore babies' social releasers, the babies first protested, then became listless and motionless - showing social releasers are important.
  • Challenge to monotropy: Schaffer & Emerson (1964) - many babies formed multiple attachments simultaneously; some formed primary attachment to someone other than the mother. Rutter (1995) argued all attachments are equivalent, not arranged in a hierarchy.
  • Socially sensitive: the law of accumulated separation may make working mothers feel guilty. Bowlby's emphasis on the mother as primary attachment has been used to argue against women working outside the home.
  • Critical/sensitive period - too rigid? Rutter's Romanian orphans study showed some children could develop attachments after age 2 - suggests the period is sensitive (more flexible) rather than strictly critical.

ASCMI is a great memory aid (Adaptive, Social releasers, Critical period, Monotropy, Internal working model). Examiners credit the term "monotropy" and the named two laws (continuity and accumulated separation).

3.4  Ainsworth's Strange Situation (1970)

Ainsworth (1970) - the Strange Situation: a controlled observation designed to measure the security of attachment in 12-18-month-old infants.

Procedure: 100 middle-class American infants observed through a one-way mirror in a lab. Eight episodes of 3 minutes each: (1) baby + mother in unfamiliar room; (2) stranger enters; (3) mother leaves; (4) mother returns, stranger leaves; (5) mother leaves; (6) baby alone; (7) stranger returns; (8) mother returns.

Behaviours measured:

  • Proximity-seeking - infant stays close to caregiver
  • Exploration and secure-base behaviour - infant uses caregiver as a base to explore
  • Stranger anxiety - distress when stranger appears
  • Separation anxiety - distress when caregiver leaves
  • Response to reunion - how infant behaves when caregiver returns

Findings - three attachment types:

Type%Behaviour
Secure (Type B)~66%Explores happily; moderate separation and stranger anxiety; happy reunion with caregiver. Caregiver-sensitive.
Insecure-avoidant (Type A)~22%Explores freely; little separation or stranger anxiety; avoids contact at reunion. Caregiver typically not very sensitive.
Insecure-resistant / ambivalent (Type C)~12%Explores little; very high separation and stranger anxiety; seeks and resists contact at reunion. Caregiver inconsistently responsive.

Caregiver sensitivity hypothesis: securely attached infants have caregivers who are sensitive to their needs; insecure attachments result from less sensitive parenting.


Evaluation:

  • High reliability: Bick et al. (2012) - inter-rater agreement was 94%; the Strange Situation produces consistent results when raters are trained.
  • Predictive validity: securely attached children have better outcomes in childhood (Kokkinos, 2007 - less bullying) and adulthood (Hamilton, 2000 - better romantic relationships) - supports the internal working model.
  • Culture-bound: based on Western, individualist assumptions. Takahashi (1990) - Japanese infants showed high resistant attachment because they are rarely separated from mothers - the Strange Situation was so distressing they had to stop early.
  • Limited types: Main & Solomon (1986) identified a fourth type - disorganised (Type D) - inconsistent, contradictory behaviour, often associated with abuse.
  • Ethical issues: deliberately causes distress in infants; some argue this is unjustifiable.

3.5  Cultural variations - van IJzendoorn & Kroonenberg (1988)

van IJzendoorn & Kroonenberg (1988): a meta-analysis of 32 studies using the Strange Situation, involving 1,990 infants across 8 countries. Looked at proportions of secure, avoidant, and resistant attachment.

Findings:

  • Secure attachment was the most common in every country, ranging from 50% in China to 75% in Britain.
  • Insecure-avoidant was most common in individualistic Western cultures - Germany (35%) highest, reflecting parenting that values independence.
  • Insecure-resistant was most common in collectivist cultures - Japan (27%) and Israel, reflecting parenting that promotes closeness.
  • Variation within countries was 1.5× greater than variation between countries.

Conclusion: secure attachment is the universal norm, suggesting attachment is innate and biological (supports Bowlby). However, cultural practices do influence attachment styles - so both nature and culture matter.


Evaluation:

  • Large sample: 1,990 infants increases internal validity and statistical power.
  • Imposed etic: using the Strange Situation (designed in the US) to study other cultures imposes a Western standard - separation may have different meanings in different cultures.
  • Non-representative samples: many of the 32 studies came from small subcultures; e.g. only 36 children in the Chinese sample - cannot claim true national representativeness.
  • Confounding variables: different studies had different methodological standards (e.g. observer training); within-culture sub-cultural differences (e.g. urban vs rural) may have skewed national figures.
  • Cross-cultural meaning of behaviour: Takahashi (1990) noted Japanese mothers were observed grabbing the infant on reunion to comfort them - what looks like "resistance" may simply be a different cultural way of seeking comfort.

Memorise the headline figures: 1,990 infants across 8 countries; secure highest in Britain (75%), lowest in China (50%); avoidant highest in Germany (35%); resistant highest in Japan (27%); within-country variation was 1.5× the between-country variation.

3.6  Bowlby's theory of maternal deprivation (1944)

Bowlby (1951): "Mother-love in infancy and childhood is as important for mental health as are vitamins and proteins for physical health."

Maternal deprivation hypothesis: being separated from a primary attachment figure (typically the mother) for prolonged or repeated periods during the critical period (first 2.5 years; possibly up to age 5) causes serious psychological harm.

Distinction: separation = brief; deprivation = prolonged or repeated, leading to loss of emotional care.


Effects of maternal deprivation:

Intellectual development
Lower IQ; Goldfarb (1947) - children left in institutions had IQs of 68 vs 96 for fostered children.
Emotional development
Affectionless psychopathy: inability to feel guilt or empathy or form deep emotional bonds with others. Associated with criminality.

Bowlby (1944) - 44 thieves study: 44 juvenile thieves and a control group of 44 non-criminal but emotionally disturbed young people. Bowlby interviewed each and their families.

Findings: 14 of the 44 thieves showed signs of affectionless psychopathy; 12 of these 14 had experienced prolonged separation from their mother in their first two years. In the control group, only 2 had experienced separation. Concluded that early separation causes affectionless psychopathy and delinquency.


Evaluation:

  • Influential evidence: 44 thieves study had significant impact on childcare policy, e.g. children's hospital visiting arrangements.
  • Methodological problems with 44 thieves: Bowlby conducted the interviews and the diagnoses himself - researcher bias. Data were retrospective and based on memory, lacking reliability.
  • Confounding deprivation and privation: Rutter (1981) argued Bowlby confused deprivation (loss of an attachment) with privation (never forming one). Many of Bowlby's "deprived" children may never have formed attachments - privation has worse and different effects.
  • Contradictory evidence: Lewis (1954) replicated the 44 thieves with 500 young people - found no relationship between maternal deprivation and criminality.
  • Critical period is too rigid: Koluchová (1976) studied Czech twins who suffered severe deprivation from 18 months to 7 years and showed remarkable recovery - suggesting the effects are not always irreversible.
  • Socially sensitive: theory has been used to argue against women working outside the home and using nursery care.

3.7  Romanian orphan studies - institutionalisation (Rutter, 2011)

Romanian orphans: in the 1990s, following the fall of Ceauşescu, ~100,000 children were found in poor Romanian institutions. Many were later adopted internationally - allowing researchers to study the effects of institutionalisation and recovery.


Rutter et al. (2011) - English and Romanian Adoptee (ERA) study: followed 165 Romanian orphans adopted by British families. Tested at ages 4, 6, 11, 15. Compared with 52 British adoptees as controls.

Findings:

  • At arrival, half the Romanian children showed delayed intellectual development and most were undernourished.
  • By age 4: those adopted before 6 months showed normal IQ (mean 102); those adopted between 6 months and 2 years had IQ 86; those adopted after 2 years had IQ 77.
  • Frequency of disinhibited attachment (overly friendly to strangers, attention-seeking) was common in those adopted after 6 months.

Zeanah et al. (2005) - Bucharest Early Intervention Project (BEIP): 95 institutionalised Romanian children (aged 12-31 months) vs 50 non-institutionalised controls. Strange Situation results: 74% of controls showed secure attachment vs only 19% of institutionalised children; 65% of institutionalised showed disorganised attachment.


Effects of institutionalisation:

Disinhibited attachment
Overly friendly to strangers, attention-seeking, no preference for familiar caregivers. An adaptation to having multiple temporary carers in the institution.
Mental retardation / lower IQ
Lack of stimulation in institutions causes cognitive delay. Recovery is possible if adoption occurs early enough (before 6 months in Rutter's data).

Evaluation:

  • Real-life application: findings led to changes in care of orphans - emphasis on a small number of consistent caregivers (key worker system); discouragement of large institutions.
  • Fewer extraneous variables: Romanian orphans had not experienced trauma other than institutionalisation - so effects can be more directly attributed to institutional care than in war orphan studies.
  • Lack of generalisability: Romanian institutions had unusually poor standards (severe deprivation of stimulation); other institutional experiences may be less damaging.
  • Children not randomly assigned: the children adopted earliest were often more socially engaging - which may explain better outcomes - rather than age of adoption alone.
  • Ongoing research: long-term effects still being studied; some impacts may emerge later in life.

3.8  Influence of early attachment on later relationships

The internal working model (Bowlby) hypothesises that the quality of early attachment shapes a child's expectations of future relationships across the lifespan.

Childhood relationships
Securely attached children are more sociable and form better friendships. Myron-Wilson & Smith (1998) - 196 London children: insecure-avoidant most likely to be bullied; insecure-resistant most likely to be bullies; secure rarely involved.
Romantic relationships
Hazan & Shaver (1987) - the "love quiz": 620 American newspaper respondents. Found strong correlations between attachment type and adult romantic style: securely attached adults had longer, more positive relationships; avoidant struggled with intimacy; resistant were jealous.
Mental health
Insecure attachment is associated with greater risk of anxiety and depression in adulthood. Bifulco et al. (2002) - women who had been insecurely attached as children were more likely to suffer from depression as adults.
Parenting
Bailey et al. (2007) - 99 mothers, their own attachment to their mothers (using the Adult Attachment Interview), and observed attachment to their own children: mothers with poor early attachment had children classified as insecurely attached. Supports intergenerational transmission.

Evaluation:

  • Research support: Fearon & Roisman (2017) review found early attachment consistently predicted later development, especially insecure-avoidant patterns.
  • Mixed findings - not always deterministic: Zimmerman et al. (2000) - childhood attachment was not a good predictor of attachment to parents in adolescence; major life events (parental divorce, bereavement) had more influence.
  • Methodological problems: most studies (e.g. Hazan & Shaver) rely on self-report questionnaires - retrospective and subject to social desirability and recall bias.
  • Determinism vs probabilism: early attachment predicts later outcomes but does not determine them; many insecurely attached children form good relationships later.
  • Socially sensitive: labelling people as having a "type" of attachment may be self-fulfilling and damaging.

Topic 4 - Clinical Psychology and Mental Health

4.1  Definitions of abnormality

Four definitions of abnormality on the AQA spec - each has strengths and limitations; none is sufficient alone.

Statistical infrequency
Behaviour is abnormal if it occurs rarely in the population (typically more than 2 standard deviations from the mean). Example: IQ < 70 (about 2% of the population) is used to diagnose intellectual disability disorder.

Strengths: objective, statistical cut-off. Limitations: rare but desirable behaviours (e.g. very high IQ) are also "abnormal" - so unusual ≠ undesirable. Also depends on cut-off being meaningful.
Deviation from social norms
Behaviour is abnormal if it violates the unwritten rules of a society - what is "normal" varies by culture and era. Example: antisocial personality disorder (DSM-5) requires "absence of prosocial internal standards".

Strengths: takes social context into account. Limitations: social norms vary across cultures/times (homosexuality classified as a disorder until 1973); risk of cultural relativism and abuse (e.g. political dissidence diagnosed as mental illness in USSR).
Failure to function adequately (FFA)
Behaviour is abnormal if the person cannot cope with everyday life - e.g. unable to maintain hygiene, hold a job, eat regularly. Rosenhan & Seligman (1989) identified signs: severe personal distress, irrational/dangerous behaviour, no longer conforming to interpersonal rules.

Strengths: patient-centred, observable. Limitations: some people who fail to function are not mentally ill (poverty, life crises); subjective judgement of "adequate".
Deviation from ideal mental health (Jahoda, 1958)
Behaviour is abnormal if it departs from criteria of mental health. Jahoda's six criteria: no symptoms of distress; rational/accurate perception of self; self-actualisation; can cope with stress; realistic view of the world; autonomy.

Strengths: comprehensive, positive approach. Limitations: very demanding criteria - few people meet all of them; culturally biased (self-actualisation is a Western, individualist value).

Evaluation:

  • No single definition is sufficient: in practice, mental health professionals use multiple criteria (e.g. DSM-5 uses elements of FFA and ideal mental health).
  • Cultural relativism: the definitions of abnormality (especially social norms and ideal mental health) reflect Western, individualist values - hearing voices is abnormal in the UK but may be a spiritual gift in other cultures.
  • Labelling effects: being labelled "abnormal" can be stigmatising and self-fulfilling.

For each definition learn one strength and one limitation. Examiners reward you for naming Jahoda (1958) and her six criteria, and Rosenhan & Seligman (1989) for FFA.

4.2  Phobias - characteristics & behavioural explanation

Phobia (DSM-5): a persistent, irrational fear of an object or situation that is out of proportion to the actual danger. DSM-5 categories include specific phobia (animals, objects), social anxiety (social situations), agoraphobia (public spaces/leaving home).

Behavioural characteristics
Panic (crying, screaming, running); avoidance; endurance with severe anxiety.
Emotional characteristics
Anxiety and fear - persistent or cued by phobic stimulus; out of proportion to the real threat.
Cognitive characteristics
Selective attention to the phobic stimulus; irrational beliefs; cognitive distortions - perceiving the stimulus as worse than it is.

Two-process model (Mowrer, 1947) - the behavioural explanation:

Acquired by classical conditioning
A phobia is learned through association. UCS (e.g. loud noise) produces UCR (fear). When NS (e.g. rat) is paired with the UCS, the NS becomes a CS that produces a CR of fear. Watson & Rayner (1920) - Little Albert: 9-month-old conditioned to fear a white rat by pairing it with a loud noise. Fear later generalised to other furry objects.
Maintained by operant conditioning
Avoiding the feared stimulus reduces anxiety (negative reinforcement) - which strengthens the avoidance behaviour. The phobia is thus maintained over time.

Evaluation of two-process model:

  • Real-world application: explains why exposure therapies (e.g. flooding) work - they prevent avoidance and so the maintained reinforcement is broken.
  • Supporting evidence: Little Albert (1920); Sue et al. (1994) - 50% of patients with arachnophobia recall an initial traumatic experience with a spider.
  • Incomplete explanation: some phobias appear without any traumatic experience; some traumatic experiences do not lead to phobias. Bounton (2007) argued the model ignores cognitive aspects (irrational beliefs).
  • Biological preparedness (Seligman, 1971): humans are evolutionarily prepared to fear certain stimuli (snakes, spiders, heights) more than others (cars, guns) - the two-process model doesn't explain this.
  • Cognitive characteristics ignored: phobias involve irrational thoughts not just learned responses - cognitive approach better at explaining these.

4.3  Phobias - behavioural treatments

Systematic desensitisation (Wolpe, 1958)
A gradual approach. Uses reciprocal inhibition: fear and relaxation cannot exist simultaneously. Three steps: (1) relaxation training (breathing, visualisation); (2) construct an anxiety hierarchy from least to most feared; (3) gradually expose patient to each step while practicing relaxation, moving up only when the previous step causes no anxiety.
Flooding
Immediate, prolonged exposure to the most feared stimulus, without escape. No anxiety hierarchy. Through extinction, the conditioned response (fear) is exhausted because the feared stimulus is not actually dangerous. Patient must give fully informed consent. Typically one long session (2-3 hours).

Evaluation:

  • Effective for SD: Gilroy et al. (2003) followed 42 patients with spider phobia after 3 × 45-minute SD sessions; at 3 and 33 months were less fearful than a control group. Evidence of long-term effectiveness.
  • Effective for flooding: Ougrin (2011) found flooding can be at least as effective as cognitive therapies in many cases - and quicker (1 session vs 10+ for SD).
  • Acceptable to patients - SD: low attrition rates; clients comfortable with gradual approach.
  • Traumatic - flooding: high attrition rates; some patients drop out due to severe distress. Schumacher et al. (2015) - both patients and therapists rated flooding as more stressful than SD.
  • Less effective for complex phobias: social phobias may have a cognitive component that requires CBT - behavioural treatments alone may be less effective.
  • Symptom substitution: some critics argue treating only the behavioural symptom leaves underlying causes; however, this concept is not well-supported empirically.

4.4  Depression - characteristics & cognitive explanations

Depression (DSM-5 - major depressive disorder): a mood disorder characterised by low mood and energy.

Behavioural characteristics
Reduced activity / loss of energy; disruption to sleep (insomnia or hypersomnia) and appetite (loss or gain); aggression and self-harm.
Emotional characteristics
Persistent low mood; anger (at self or others); lowered self-esteem; loss of pleasure (anhedonia).
Cognitive characteristics
Poor concentration; dwelling on the negative; absolutist (black-and-white) thinking.

Beck (1967) - cognitive triad & negative schemas:

Beck argued people prone to depression have three cognitive vulnerabilities:

  1. Faulty information processing - selective attention to negative aspects of a situation; absolutist thinking.
  2. Negative self-schemas - a fixed, negative view of the self ("I am worthless") that filters all information.
  3. The negative triad - negative views of (a) the self ("I am useless"), (b) the world ("everything is against me"), and (c) the future ("things will never get better").

Ellis (1962) - ABC model:

Ellis proposed depression results from irrational beliefs. The model:

  • A = Activating event (something happens, e.g. failed exam)
  • B = Beliefs about the event (rational: "I needed to study more"; irrational: "I am a failure")
  • C = Consequences - the emotional and behavioural reaction. Irrational beliefs cause depression, not the events themselves.

Ellis identified common irrational beliefs - "musturbatory thinking": "I must always succeed"; "I must be loved"; "life must be fair".


Evaluation:

  • Supporting evidence for Beck: Grazioli & Terry (2000) - 65 pregnant women assessed for cognitive vulnerability and post-natal depression; high cognitive vulnerability predicted depression. Clark & Beck (1999) - cognitions assessed before depression also predict it onset.
  • Practical application: Beck's theory led to cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) - a highly effective treatment.
  • Doesn't explain all aspects: Beck's theory doesn't explain anger, hallucinations, or delusions found in some depressed patients.
  • Ellis - partial explanation only: Ellis's model applies most to "reactive" depression (triggered by life events) and less to "endogenous" depression (no obvious trigger).
  • Doesn't address biological factors: ignores genetic and neurochemical (e.g. serotonin) factors. Cognitive vulnerability may itself be biologically caused.
  • Cause vs effect: negative thinking may be a symptom rather than a cause of depression.

4.5  Depression - cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT)

Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT): the most common psychological treatment for depression. Combines cognitive (challenging thoughts) and behavioural (changing behaviour) techniques. Typically 5-20 sessions.

Beck's cognitive therapy
Identifies negative triad and irrational thoughts. Therapist and client work together as collaborators (the client is the "scientist"). Tests negative beliefs by using thought catching and gathering behavioural evidence (e.g. recording positive events). Patient as scientist - testing reality of negative beliefs.
Ellis's REBT (rational emotive behaviour therapy)
Extends the ABC to ABCDE: D = Dispute the irrational belief; E = Effect (a new effective behaviour/belief). Three types of dispute: (1) empirical (where's the evidence?); (2) logical (does it follow logically?); (3) pragmatic (does this belief help me?).

Behavioural activation: in addition to cognitive work, CBT encourages patients to engage in enjoyable activities (exercise, hobbies, socialising) that provide positive reinforcement and challenge depressive avoidance behaviours.


Evaluation:

  • Effectiveness: March et al. (2007) compared CBT, antidepressants, and combined: 81% improvement with CBT; 81% with antidepressants; 86% combined. CBT is at least as effective as drugs.
  • Long-term effects: CBT addresses underlying cognition, so relapse rates can be lower than for drugs alone.
  • Not appropriate for everyone: requires patient motivation and articulation; severe depression may make this impossible (need drugs first). Patients who do not articulate well may not benefit.
  • Overemphasis on cognition: ignores broader social/life circumstances - homelessness, abuse, poverty - that cause depression and cannot be "thought away" (sometimes called the "blame the victim" critique).
  • Therapist-client relationship: a strong therapeutic alliance may be more important than the specific CBT technique (Rosenzweig, 1936).

4.6  OCD - characteristics & biological explanations

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) (DSM-5): characterised by obsessions (recurrent intrusive thoughts) and/or compulsions (repetitive behaviours performed to reduce anxiety).

Behavioural characteristics
Compulsions are repetitive (e.g. handwashing, checking) and used to reduce anxiety caused by obsessions. Avoidance of triggering situations.
Emotional characteristics
Anxiety and distress from intrusive thoughts; shame, guilt, disgust; depression (often co-morbid).
Cognitive characteristics
Obsessions (e.g. fear of contamination); recognition that these are irrational; cognitive coping strategies (e.g. prayer, counting) which may interfere with normal functioning; selective attention to anxiety-generating stimuli.

Genetic explanation:

  • Candidate genes linked to OCD:
    • SERT (5-HTT) gene - affects transport of serotonin; mutations linked to OCD (Ozaki et al., 2003).
    • COMT gene - regulates dopamine; some variants more common in OCD patients.
  • OCD is polygenic: Taylor (2013) analysed studies and found up to 230 different genes may be involved.
  • Diathesis-stress: certain genes only leave some people more vulnerable to OCD; an environmental stressor (trauma, stress) is needed to trigger the condition.
  • Family/twin studies: Lewis (1936) - 37% of OCD patients had a parent with OCD; Nestadt et al. (2010): identical twins had a 68% concordance rate for OCD vs 31% for non-identical twins - supports genetic component.

Neural explanation:

  • Low serotonin: reduced activity of the neurotransmitter serotonin linked to depression and mood regulation issues in OCD. Antidepressants that increase serotonin (SSRIs) reduce OCD symptoms.
  • Abnormal brain circuits: the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), caudate nucleus, and thalamus form a worry circuit. Hyperactivity in this circuit causes obsessive thoughts. The OFC detects worries; the caudate nucleus normally suppresses minor worry signals - in OCD it doesn't, so worry signals reach the thalamus and produce obsessions/compulsions.

Evaluation:

  • Support for genes: high twin concordance (Nestadt et al., 2010); family studies confirm familial trend.
  • Polygenic and complex: no single "OCD gene" - dozens of genes each have small effects; very hard to pin down specific genetic causes.
  • Support for serotonin: SSRIs (which increase serotonin) effectively reduce OCD symptoms - suggesting low serotonin is involved.
  • Support for neural circuits: PET scans show high activity in OFC/caudate of OCD patients (e.g. Saxena & Rauch, 2000).
  • Cause vs effect: abnormal brain activity may be a result of OCD rather than its cause; correlation does not prove causation.
  • Biological reductionism: ignores environmental triggers (trauma, stress) and cognitive aspects (irrational beliefs about responsibility for harm) - a diathesis-stress model is more comprehensive.

Always name SERT (5-HTT) and COMT as candidate genes. For the neural explanation, the key terms are serotonin, orbitofrontal cortex, caudate nucleus, and worry circuit.

4.7  OCD - biological treatments (drug therapy)

Drug therapy for OCD targets the serotonin system - the main biological treatment.

SSRIs (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors)
First-line treatment. Example: fluoxetine (Prozac), typical dose 20 mg/day. They block the reuptake of serotonin in the synapse, increasing serotonin available to be picked up by the receiving neuron. Effects build over 3-4 months. Often combined with CBT.
Alternative drugs
If SSRIs ineffective: tricyclic antidepressants (e.g. clomipramine) - act on serotonin but with more side effects; or SNRIs (serotonin-noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors) - newer option.

Evaluation:

  • Effectiveness: Soomro et al. (2009) - meta-analysis of 17 trials found SSRIs significantly better than placebo at reducing OCD symptoms. About 70% of patients improved.
  • Cost-effective and non-disruptive: cheap compared with psychological therapies; can be taken alongside daily life.
  • Side effects: indigestion, blurred vision, loss of libido (~30% of patients). For clomipramine: weight gain, tremors, more severe side effects.
  • Doesn't cure - only manages: if patient stops taking drugs, symptoms typically return - drugs are a maintenance treatment, not a cure.
  • Some cases biased - publication bias: Goldacre (2013) - pharma-sponsored studies often only publish positive findings; effectiveness may be overstated.
  • Combined treatments often most effective: drugs + CBT typically outperform either alone, suggesting drugs are best as part of a combined approach.